Introduction
The recent global financial crisis has been the outcome of, among other things, the mismatch between institutions and the reality of the market in the current global financial system. The world we are living in now is drastically different from that of a half century ago. So is the global financial market. Yet, the basic design and operations of the international financial institutions (IFIs) are not now that different from then. The Bretton Woods institutions and the postwar international monetary order were framed by design of and negotiation between, primarily, the United States (US) and the United Kingdom during World War II. In the immediate postwar years, the US was the preeminent power overseeing operations of the international monetary system (IMS) through the International Monetary Fund (IMF); postwar reconstruction and development through the World Bank and bilateral economic aid; and liberalization of trade through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which became the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. With the recovery of Europe and rapid economic growth of Japan, these countries became more assertive in global economic governance (discussed more below). But it was essentially the US -and Western Europe to a smaller degree -that made the global economic rules, with Japan largely a follower, usually content to go with the US position under the latter's nuclear umbrella.
This scene started to be transformed in the late 1980s and early 1990s. With the collapse of the former Soviet Union and consequent impact on Eastern Europe, over 400 million people were integrated into the free market economic system. With the opening and accelerated growth of the economy of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and India, nearly 2.5 billion people became fully integrated into the global economic system. That means, over the last 20 years, that we have seen the economies with half the world's population integrate into the global economic system. In addition, globalization of national economies across the world, both advanced and developing, started to accelerate in the 1990s. Emerging economies accelerated financial deregulation and opening, which led to rapid integration of their financial markets into the global market. This also led to massive -and volatilecapital inflows to these economies.
The IFIs that were designed more than 60 years ago can no longer effectively meet the challenges posed by the current global economy. While the global financial market has become integrated like a single market, there is no global central bank or global regulatory body. And while global imbalances have intensified, there has been no international instrument or mechanism to drive orderly adjustments of those imbalances. Only the global crisis could stimulate the adjustment, which would impose heavy costs on the national and global economy.
There also has been a rapid shift in the weight of economic power. In purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, the share of the Group of 7 (G7) countries in global gross domestic product (GDP) fell from nearly half to 40% in the last 10 years. During this time, the share of emerging market economies increased rapidly. Virtually all projections predict that this trend will intensify. For example, the global GDP share of the "BRIC" countries -Brazil, Russian Federation, India, and the PRC -was 20% in 2000. It has increased to 30% in 2010 and is expected to increase to nearly 40% by 2020. This means that we are facing not only inadequate international economic institutions to cope with global economic issues, but an inadequate governance structure at those institutions as well.
Therefore, the tasks facing us today are: (i) to reform the IFIs -mandate, resources, management, and governance structure; (ii) to reform the system such as the IMS, and regulatory framework of the global financial system; and (iii) to reform global economic governance. This last concept is difficult to define. It is abstract in the sense that there are no such governance bodies or organizations as we see in the case of national government. Global economic governance may be a combination of, at this point, international organizations based on treaty or agreement, rules (accounting, capital standards, etc.), norms, practices, and decision making for which rules, guidelines, and codes have arisen to manage the global economy. For the purposes of this paper, however, the main focus will be on the role of the Group of Twenty (G20) summit meetings largely because at the G20 meeting in Pittsburg in 2009, leaders declared that the G20 would be a "premier forum for our international economic cooperation".
At the center of the rapid change in the distribution of global economic weight has been the rapid ascent of the Asian economies during the past half century. Japan took the lead in the 1950s-1960s, followed by Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea (Korea); Singapore; and Taipei,China in the 1960-1970s, with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand in the 1980s. But the rapid growth of these economies did not pose a serious challenge to global economic governance issues, because they were relatively small economies (except Japan), and broadly under the influence of the US or Europe for various reasons, including security pacts. However, when the PRC and India woke up from their rather long hibernation and started to show staggering rates of economic growth, not only did the ascendency of Asia for this century become evident, but also did a change of international political and economic dynamics.
Reflecting these shifts, and with the global crisis, a new global economic governance forum, G20, emerged. In this forum, there are five Asian countries (six if we include Australia) with a seat. This is in great contrast to the "outgoing" forum, G7, where only one Asian country was represented. Asians have now achieved greater participation in global economic governance. But will this achievement in the near future significantly change the nature of global economic governance, the global economic order, or the way the IFIs will be run ?
Asians may be happy and proud to have greater representation in such a forum. But we Asians also have to recognize that we remain ambivalent about our global roles. We wanted to sit at the high table. We wanted to alter the rules of the game and have a stronger voice in global governance. But perhaps we still lack vision for the future global economic system. We also do not want to take any greater responsibilities or burdens. Asian countries so far have been passive followers of the international economic order, which was shaped by the West after the Second World War. They have grown fast under this global environment. Most Asian countries, including the PRC and Japan, are preoccupied with domestic growth and political stability, and lack the vision of how to shape the future global economic system.
In this situation, can we expect any significant changes to the global economic institutions and system with the emergence of the G20? If, for instance, the role of international institutions such as the IMF is strengthened (as endorsed by G20 summit meetings) without much real change either to their operations or governance structure, what would that mean to Asia? Would that mean stronger governance over Asian economies by Western controlled and dominated institutions, or a more significant Asian role in global governance? What should Asia do to take the current opportunity of enhanced representation in order to enhance its de facto role in the global economic governance?
The second section discusses the problems of the IMS. It reviews present debate and discussions on how to reform the IMS along with developing countries' interest in it. The third section discusses the future role of the G20, which is expected to remain a premier forum for global economic governance for a while, as it is important to have effective global governance not only for orchestrating the successful reforms of the IMS and the IFIs but for securing effective policy coordination for balanced, stable, and sustained growth of the global economy. The fourth section discusses how the IFIs (particularly the IMF) should be reformed.
Global Financial Crisis and International Monetary System
There have been extensive discussions about the causes of the crisis: a financial regulatory framework that encouraged excessive risk taking and high leverage in financial institutions; interconnectedness among large financial institutions in the global financial system through derivatives markets; and inadequate fiscal and monetary policies that fueled asset bubbles. And so on. From a fundamental standpoint, however, the issue starts with the institutional mismatch that failed to meet new challenges posed by the rapid globalization that progressed over the last several decades. The global financial market has been integrated like a single market -yet there has been no international lender of last resort or global regulatory body.
Financial institutions are competing with each other across national borders these days. Banks in Korea, Japan, Malaysia, Thailand, US, and Europe compete for the same clients. Banks in Korea, for example, have to compete with many other banks from the US, Europe, and Japan, to secure major Korean companies (which already have become global companies) as their main customers. They have to provide similar kinds of banking services to those of foreign banks so as to keep them as their customers. In the process, their balance sheets have become increasingly exposed to assets and liabilities denominated in foreign currencies (especially the dollar) (Park 2010) .
When an external shock, such as the US subprime mortgage crisis, hits, liquidity evaporates in the global financial system and banks all over the world face a severe liquidity shortage. Banks can be helped over a local currency shortage by their national central banks. However, with a shortage of foreign liquidity, central banks in EMEs are helpless. Only central banks issuing international reserve currency can bail them out, but these central banks' operations are confined to their national laws, even though the currency they issue is international. For example, the Federal Reserve issues international reserve currency but does not provide liquidity to international banks unless they are US-based. This has been one of the factors that pushed EMEs and developing countries that do not issue international currency to accumulate large foreign reserves. This in turn contributed to the global imbalances.
Other problems face the current IMS. "IMS" usually refers to the rules and institutions for international payments. It refers to the currency/monetary regimes of countries, the rules for interventions if an exchange rate is fixed or managed in some way, and the institutions that back those rules if there is a problem through official credits, controls, or parity changes (IMF 2010a) . The current IMS is deemed to be no longer adequate to meet the needs of a complex, integrated world economy. It may even exacerbate instability rather than contain it. In fact, the current IMS is something of a "non-system". After the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, the world has divided into two camps -one with major currencies that float freely and permit free flows of capital, and one with varying degrees of control over exchange rates and cross-border flows (Mateos Y Lago et al. 2010) . The current IMS does not have any established mechanism to facilitate the adjustment of global imbalances, and so they persist, becoming a source of increased uncertainty and instability.
The current IMS problems can be summarized as follows.
First, the demand for foreign reserve accumulation has been increasing despite the movement from fixed exchange rate regimes to floating rate regimes some 40 years ago. While the collapse of the Bretton Woods system was expected to lead to smaller holdings of foreign reserves, we have in fact seen a rapid rise in them among EMEs, especially after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 (Figure 1 ). If this trend continues, it is expected that total foreign reserves in dollars held outside the US will rise to 700% of US GDP by 2035 from the current level of less than 50% (IMF 2010a).
Second, this increasing demand for foreign reserves has been concentrated in US dollar assets, especially public securities. This has made it difficult for the US to achieve internal and external equilibrium. This is not a new problem for the country, whose domestic currency is used as an international currency under the fiat money system (the "Triffin" dilemma). But this problem has become more acute as the US economy weakened with deepening internal and external imbalances.
Third, as the IMS relies too heavily on the supply of currency issued by a center country (the US), it gives an exorbitant privilege to this country, which can issue Treasury bills at the lowest possible interest rate in the international capital market (Mateos Y Lago et al. 2010 , Subacchi and Drilfill 2010 , IMF 2010a and b, UN 2009 . As a result, the center country lacks any market pressure for macroeconomic policy discipline, facilitating the buildup of asset bubbles and the worsening of global imbalances. This, together with loose financial regulations, led to those in the market to seek higher yields and take greater risks in the financial system. For their part, the EMEs whose currency is not used as international currency have to bear a severe and painful adjustment when they face a currency crisis, or have to pay a steep cost in maintaining high foreign reserves for self-insurance against such a crisis. According to a recent IMF estimate, EMEs are paying about 1.3% of national income for holding large amounts of foreign reserves (assuming a 3 percentage point premium above US Treasury securities) (IMF 2010b).
Fourth, as a related problem, the global financial system depends too heavily on the center country's ability to maintain the stability of the value of its currency and strength of its own financial system. This overdependence heightens the uncertainty and source of instability. As long as the US maintains a sound financial regulatory framework, solid macroeconomic policies, and a strong and stable financial system, the system can work reasonably well. However, once US economic and financial-system credibility is weakened, the global system can become very unstable. If there were an international institution (or instruments) that could effectively monitor and govern the soundness and stability of the macro-financial policies of the US and other major economies, we might see a more stable global financial system. However, there is not.
Fifth, international capital flows have been distorted in the current IMS. The capital flows from EMEs and developing countries where the productivity of capital investment is higher, to advanced economies, especially the US, where the return to capital investment is lower. This distortion reduces the investment opportunities for developing countries to construct their infrastructure and industrial base for higher economic growth.
Given these problems, there have been various proposals to reform the current IMS. They can be grouped into two: demand-side and supply-side reform.
Demand-side reform
The key here is how to reduce the widespread strong demand for foreign reserve holdings among EMEs. Self-insurance against currency crisis is not their sole motivation for large foreign reserves. The export-oriented growth strategy has also been a significant motivation to undervalue the currency and sterilize capital inflows, leading to a large accumulation of foreign reserves. However, according to one estimate, self-insurance -especially after the Asian currency crisis -accounts for one-half to two-thirds of total reserves and has accounted for about half of the increase of total foreign reserves in the decade to 2008 (Obstfeld et al. 2008 ).
In the current global financial market environment where capital flows are volatile, EMEs and developing economies run a high risk of currency crisis. They have to walk a very narrow line of policy discipline between openness of their financial system and sound economic management. Although the history of their financial market opening is short, many of these economies' capital markets are more open and integrated into the global system than the advanced economies' (Figure 2 ). If their balance-of-payments position deteriorates for a sustained period, they have a high risk of at some point facing a massive sudden reversal of foreign capital flow, with a huge impact on the domestic financial system and the economy. Even though economic management may be sound in these countries, they are exposed to risk through contagion from a crisis that has begun elsewhere. To insure against such a possibility, they have to manage their external balance carefully, maintaining a competitive export environment and a stable macroeconomic situation, including currency stability and competitiveness. This pushes them to intervene in the currency market when there are massive inflows of foreign capital and a buildup of foreign reserves.
There have been several proposals to reduce the self-insurance motivation and thereby demand for foreign reserves. They include third-party insurance and the expansion of the opportunity to borrow from a global and regional reserve pool, or access to global lender of last resort (or something similar). However, the first option would be too costly. The private market to insure against such a risk has so far failed to be established. Public insurance through any international organization would be too costly and unfair in sharing the burden (IMF 2010a and b).
That leads us to the second option -building a stronger global financial safety net. The Korean authorities, which hosted the Seoul G20 Summit in November 2010, have taken an initiative with the IMF to push through this option by improving the current financing facilities of the IMF. The IMF has made some innovations in its lending program in consultation with the G20 countries' authorities and these were endorsed at Seoul. These innovations include refining the flexible credit line (FCL) by increasing the size and maturity of the loan with improved pre-qualification criteria for the loan to reduce the "stigma" effect; and creating new lending facilities, called the precautionary credit line (PCL), for the countries who are not fully qualified for FCL but with generally sound polices, that need some precautionary financing (IMF 2010) . The G20 Summit in Seoul also agreed on efforts to increase the link between the IMF regional financing facilities.
Supply-side reform
Discussions on supply-side reform of the IMS focus on how to diversify the supply of international reserve currency. The proposals include moving to a multiple currency system; increased allocation and wider use of special drawing rights (SDR); and creating a new global reserve currency. A more diversified allocation across available and new reserve assets would reduce the system's (and individual countries') exposure to risks stemming from economic outturns and policies in a single country, and may provide more stable stores of value by increasing reserve issuers' incentives to pursue sound policies and avoid losing associated benefits. While global reserves are already diversified to some degree and further diversification is likely to continue slowly over time, the pace and eventual degree may not be enough to bring about the desirable balance in supply, especially if reserve accumulation continues apace (IMF 2010 a and b).
A key question is whether diversification should be encouraged among suitable existing currencies, or if it should be sought more with global reserve assets, acting as a complement or even substitute to existing ones (IMF 2010a). Each proposal has its pros and cons; they also face trade-offs between desirability and political feasibility. As the world becomes more multi-polar in terms of GDP, the drive for a multi-currency system that mimics global economic weights is likely to increase. A more diversified reserve system would be superior to the current system in that it would help discipline policies of all reserve issuers, given enhanced substitutability of their assets. However, a disadvantage would be lower network externalities and possible costs for trade and investment due to volatility among major reserve currencies (McKinsey Global Institute 2009).
A more ambitious reform option would be to develop a global currency -"Bancor," for example, as Keynes proposed. A global currency issued by a global central bank would be designed as a stable store of value that is not tied exclusively to the conditions of any particular economy. One option is for that global currency -let us keep calling it Bancor -to be adopted by fiat as a common currency (like the euro was), an approach that would immediately result in widespread use and eliminate exchange rate volatility among adopters. A somewhat less ambitious option would be for Bancor to circulate alongside national currencies, though it would need to be adopted by fiat in at least some countries in order for an exchange market to develop. If Bancor were to circulate as a dominant currency in place of the US dollar, then current account imbalances that reflect today's situation -namely surplus countries pegging to Bancor with deficit countries floating against it -would adjust more systematically, and perhaps more automatically than in the current system since the deficit currencies would be expected to depreciate against Bancor (IMF 2010a). However, this option would suffer from the same problems that are faced by common currency areas such as the Eurozone. Adoption of a common currency could limit scope for adjustment to shocks by individual countries. It would be essential to construct governance arrangements that ensure accountability of the Bancor-issuing institution while ensuring its independence. It also requires a substantial concession of economic sovereignty by individual countries. Hence political feasibility is very low.
As another option, a greater role could be considered for SDR (UN 2009 , Julius 2010 , IMF 2010a and b, Zhou 2009 , Chin and Yong 2010 . The SDR had been almost forgotten until the recent global crisis. The SDR is an international reserve asset created by the IMF in 1969 to supplement official reserves of member countries. For countries with a balance-of-payments need, it represents an unconditional right to obtain foreign exchange or other key reserve assets from other IMF members. The value of the SDR is based on a basket of currencies (currently the US dollar, euro, yen, and pound).
1 But it is not itself is a currency.
There are many benefits to using the SDR broadly as a reserve asset. With a value defined in terms of a basket of major currencies, it has more stable store-of-value and unit-of-account attributes. As in the case of Bancor, if some surplus countries that currently peg to a national currency (e.g. US dollar) were to peg instead to the SDR, some automaticity would be introduced in the global adjustment process as the currencies of deficit countries could depreciate relative to others in the basket. However, one disadvantage is that its use so far has been essentially restricted to the official sector and only about SDR 200 billion (about 4% of total global reserves) has been allocated to member countries (IMF 2010a). Additional hurdles to developing an SDR-based system include potential resistance from reserve issuers who have no direct use for SDRs; restrictive allocation rules and complicated usage rules; the lack of deep and liquid markets; and the need to convert SDRs into a freely usable currency for most payment transactions.
In 2009, Mr Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of the People's Bank of China, suggested wider use of the SDR as a reserve asset (Zhou 2009 ). As the confidence in the future value of the US dollar has weakened, countries with large amounts of US-dollar foreign reserve assets are concerned about losing value. If, for instance, the PRC moves to rebalance its foreign reserve composition from the dollar to other currencies, it risks causing an immediate fall in the dollar, with no beneficial consequences for the PRC, the US, or the global economy. If the PRC could hold more SDR instead, its foreign reserves would be immediately better diversified into that currency basket, becoming more stable in value. However, this would be possible when there is an international agreement to increase the allocation and use of the SDR more extensively, extending its use from the official to private sector.
Historical Experience and Prospects
As discussed above, although there have been widely shared views on the problems of the current IMS, there are different views on how to proceed toward the reform of the IMS, or whether we ever need reform from the current IMS. Some economists argue that we need fundamental reform while others believe that we cannot find any better alternative to the current system in the near future. The latter group also argue that what we need is reform of the regulatory aspects of the global financial -not monetary -system. They argue that the current system is the outcome of an evolution that complemented the weakness of the previous systems including the gold standard, Bretton Woods, and the interwar free-floating system, and has worked reasonably well over the last 40 years (Truman 2010) .
The evolution of the IMS has been shaped not only by the experiences of the previous systems but also by the dominant economic thoughts, balance of economic weights, and political economy of the time. The dominant reserve currency changed with the shift of economic power, but only after a substantial time lag. In the initial stage of these changes, the dominant country was always reluctant to accept changes and push reforms, while the emerging power was hesitant to accept greater responsibility as a reserve issuer. As a result, there was no big impact, but only gradual and incremental change.
As with the dollar today, the demise of the pound was widely anticipated but the process was more gradual than expected and a widely predicted abrupt collapse was avoided. Even though the emergence of the US as the dominant economic power became evident after the First World War, the pound played the role of major international reserve currency for a while. The IMF estimated that official sterling reserves, excluding those held by colonies, were four times the value of official dollar reserves and that in 1947 sterling still accounted for about 87% of global foreign exchange reserves (Schenk 2010) . It took 10 years from the end of the Second World War (and a 30% devaluation of the pound) before the share of dollar reserves exceeded that of sterling. The shift from sterling to the dollar and the elimination of sterling as a major international currency resulted in periodic crises, international tensions, and conflict over the United Kingdom's domestic economic policy. In short, although it was not a painless transformation, it was still tempered by the international commitment to avoid a damaging tipping point for sterling that would have undermined confidence in the IMS as a whole (Schenk 2010 ).
The transition this century would likewise require close collaboration among the major players -incumbent and emerging powers -to avoid turbulence and severe instability in the international financial system. The shape of the IMS in the 21st century will be significantly influenced by the views, interests, and requirements of the emerging powers. However it is important to ensure the sustainability of the current system and avoid its collapse. This should include efforts at the least to strengthen policy coordination and collaboration among the major economies, and to reform the IMF to make it a more effective institution for bilateral and multilateral surveillance and as an international lender of last resort. The success on both fronts depends heavily on global economic governance reform and the role of the G20.
Global Economic Governance Reform and the G20
The global financial crisis launched the G20 Summit as a premier forum for international economic cooperation. It now clear that the problems of global imbalances, economic recession and recovery, and financial system reform cannot be discussed without involving EMEs. G7 can no longer be the right forum. For example, the G7 summit meeting started in 1974, and it took 13 years for G7 leaders to agree to meet annually. But it took only one year for G20 leaders to expect to meet annually. This shows how much such a forum was needed.
Any governance body is subject to a test of legitimacy, representativeness, and effectiveness -and the G20 is no exception. The G20, like the G7, is a self-proclaimed global economic governance forum. It is not formed on the basis of any international treaty or agreement. The G20, however, represents about 85% of the world's GDP, 80% of its trade, and 67% of its population (Heinbecker 2010) . Countries from all continents are included in the G20. Therefore, legitimacy and representativeness may not be an important hurdle for the G20 to function as a global governance forum. There is no clear reason why those 20 particular leaders should sit around the same table, but any other selection would invite similar questions and criticism. The G20 seems to be a reasonable grouping as it is balanced between advanced and emerging economies, and in terms of regional representativeness. Effectiveness, however, could be a serious challenge.
As the world may be unable to find an alternative to the G20, the G20 may well stay as the premier forum for global economic governance -for at least some time to come. Still, although it showed its usefulness as a forum for policy cooperation during the crisis, it is unclear whether it can continue to be an effective global economic governance body. The experience of G7 suggests that G20 could become no more than an annual diplomatic occasion of leaders meeting without any significant outcome to address or resolve global economic issues. A meeting with 20 leaders will find it harder to be effective than one with seven or eight leaders.
As discussed, however, the global economy desperately needs an effective forum to coordinate economic policies among advanced and developing countries. It has been fortunate that the G20 emerged as a premier forum in this circumstance. The emergence of the G20 as the premier forum for international economic cooperation could be the most profound evolution in global economic governance over the last couple decades. It represents the first adaptation of the global governance structure to reflect dramatic changes in the distribution of power since the end of the Cold War. It is also the only forum in which major established and emerging players meet in a setting of formal equality, unlike the two-tiered Security Council of the UN or the weighted voting in the IFIs.
The G20 acknowledges that global governance cannot be done by the West alone. It can provide a framework in which established and emerging powers can work out an agreement and negotiate breakthroughs on pressing global economic issues. As Patrick (2010) says "G20 has the potential to shake up the geopolitical order, introducing greater flexibility into global diplomacy and transcending the stultifying bloc politics that have too often hamstrung cooperation on global governance in formal, treaty-based institutions, including the United Nations."
The US proposed a mutual assessment of economic policies on the basis of so-called, "Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth" at the G20 Summit in Pittsburg in September 2009. The US has subjected itself to peer reviews of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the IMF. However, ''this is the first time the US has agreed, even proposed, to submit itself to a structured, full peer review process" (Lombardi 2010 ) in a forum such as the G20 where, at least formally, the peers participate on an equal footing, globally. Through this framework, leaders pledged to devise a method for setting objectives, to develop policies to support such objectives, and to assess outcomes through mutual evaluation. The IMF's involvement has been sought in providing analysis on various national and regional policy frameworks and how they fit together. On the basis of country submissions, the IMF has been asked to point out inconsistencies and/or incoherence in national assumptions, to evaluate the mutual compatibility of different country frameworks and policies, and to determine the aggregate effects of various national frameworks and policies in the global economy. Once the entire framework process has been complete, it could then be fully implemented annually. This practice represents the first instance of multilateral surveillance on a global scale in recent history. Previously, such surveillance was at best handled within the closed circle of G7.In contrast to the G7 membership, the G20 includes all the systemically important countries such as large emerging economies of PRC, India, and Brazil.
The G20' Role in Global Governance System-A Sort of Legislature?
There are three types of institutions in the global governance system: international organizations, government networks, and non-state actors (Mo 2010) . The last includes transnational civil society groups and business associations. International organizations and government networks are both inter-government organizations (IGOs). The main difference is the degree of formality. An international organization is the more structured of the two; that is, it has a constitutive inter-government agreement and a secretariat. In contrast, government networks are often created without a formal inter-government agreement and managed without a secretariat. According to this classification, the G20 is a government network in that it has neither a charter nor a secretariat. However, the G7/G8 and G20 are government networks whose jurisdictions overlap with those of existing international organizations that affect their decision; they are supervisory government networks. Since supervisory government networks make decisions that existing international organizations are expected to implement, they should be viewed as a sort of legislative body with international organizations playing the role of an executive agency. The fact that the G7/G8 and the G20 exist and have become more influential over time suggests that there is a demand in the global governance system for an effective supervisory and legislative body that is independent of international organizations (Mo 2010) .
G7 began as a kind of caucus, an informal group of legislators, with leaders reluctant to involve ministers and refusing to create a permanent secretariat. The global governance system demands a new organization that can work as a legislature and the G20, at this moment, is the alternative available. Some observers say that the G20 is already acting as a sort of legislature as it directs new rules for the global financial systems and assigns tasks to the IFIs. In thinking about the meaning and significance of the G20 in the history of global governance, it is constructive to take a step back from current issues and ask ourselves what the founding fathers of the new global governance system would make of the G20. Seen from this constitutional perspective, it is clear that the G20 belongs to the legislative branch side of the global governance system. The G20 is already acting like a legislature as it legislate new rules for the world economy and tasks and evaluates international financial institutions."
The role of the IFIs has been limited to their own jurisdiction and, to a large extent, they have not been able to be effective even in their given jurisdictions. They have been marginalized in the global economic governance and have failed to address crossjurisdictional issues such as financial stability (Varma 2002 , Stewart 1996 , Bryant 2010 . Of course, there are difficulties for the G20 to meet this role. The G20 is a group of 'systemically important' economies. Unfortunately, except for their economic impact, G20 members have little in common with respect to their ideologies and levels of development. This strengthens the need for the G20 to become more institutionalized in its process of making agreements, decisions, and overall implementation.
The legislature has two core functions: legislation, and oversight of executive agencies. The G20 should provide the mandate and oversight of the operation for international economic organizations. It also should be able to be a place where effective policy coordination among member countries could happen.
But in order for the G20 to meet this challenging task, there should be innovative institutional design for the G20. One element of criticism for the G7/G8 summits was the lack of continuity and implementation monitoring. The G20 will have to demonstrate that it can do better. However, with the increased number of participants relative to the G7/G8 and the likely more comprehensive agenda of the G20, the preparation and follow-up process for the G20 summit will be more complex and demanding as it involves many more players and less continuity in the leadership. Furthermore, unlike the G7, which is a like-mindedness group, the G20 is extremely diverse in terms of political organization and ideology. Divergences among the G20 were masked during the first year of the crisis, as countries focused on the short-term, urgent goals of preventing global economic depression. As the world has started to come out of the crisis, the underlying diversity of opinions, interests, and perspectives in the G20 could reemerge. Diversity in the composition of the membership has the risk of hindering consensus building within the G20 as was evidenced in the Toronto and Seoul summits, and, therefore, hurting the G20's effectiveness as a global decision-making body.
The G20 Needs Institutional Innovations
To build consensus and ensure effectiveness, the G20 requires creative intuitional innovations. One of them would be to set up a G20 secretariat or something similar (Linn 2010 , Carin 2010 ). At the finance minister level, the G20 chair is part of a revolving threemember management troika of "sherpas," consisting of the current chair, as well as the immediately preceding and succeeding chairs. The management picture at the leader level is less clear. The chair country now sets up a temporary secretariat for the duration of its term. The temporary secretariat coordinates the group work with technical support from the IFIs. But the G20 reliance on temporary and rotating arrangements is unlikely to last long as they already create the problem of work discontinuity and conflicts of interests. A rotating secretariat makes it hard for the G20 to maintain organizational coherence. The IMF can play a type of secretariat role for the G20; however, the agenda for the G20 could be broadened beyond macro-financial issues, such as energy and trade. Also, it may not be a good idea for the G20 to depend too much on the IMF for secretariat functions as this may compromise its ability to reform and monitor the IMF.
However, concerns have been expressed that leaders would not want to see a bureaucratic structure take over the G20 summit, or that the existence of a heavy secretarial structure could undermine the commitment by the national executive agencies to their engagement in the G20 summit processes. The aim is to manage and organize the summit to ensure continuity, institutional memory, and the implementation of plans and promises that are yet to be driven by member governments. The challenge will therefore be to keep any secretariat structure small, non-bureaucratic, and driven by capitals.
Alternative options could be considered to ensure effective logistical and technical support for the G20, such as cross-posting of high-level staff from countries that have had the G20 presidency in the past to countries taking on this role. Stronger liaison contact points and implementation-reporting requirements could be established in the key international institutions that are tasked with follow-up on the G20 summits (Linn 2010 ).
The G20 might also consider a committee system. The G20 currently works as a "committee as the whole" without select or standing committees. As the number of issues that the G20 takes up increases, the G20 may consider the use of standing committees to divide work among member countries.
Reform of the IMF
The IMF, as a key institution of in the IMS, has not played an effective role in the surveillance of the global economy and financial market. The recent upgrading of the IMF by the G20 as the main institution for the surveillance of the global financial market and economy, and the willingness of some G20 countries to include the reform of the IMS in future agenda (Sarkozy 2010 ) suggest that the IMF should be substantially reformed to meet the challenges of this upgraded role. The areas to reform are resources, lending facilities, surveillance, and governance/management. Some of them have already been endorsed by the G20 and agreed to by member countries, but in some areas, more innovative ideas must be sought.
Resources
The resources available to the IMF are far smaller than current global capital flows, and are a small fraction of total foreign reserves held by EMEs. The G20 summit meeting in London endorsed the move to increase IMF resources, including quota and borrowing capacity. The expansion and modification of the New Arrangement for Borrowing (NAB) by roughly $500 billion will approximately triple the total resources available for lending, from the current level of $250 billion. This will help the IMF to be more effective in meeting the financing gap to member countries when they face foreign currency liquidity problems. Still, its total available resources may not be enough to support all the new lending facilities under discussion to strengthen the global financial safety net. They will still be less than half the foreign reserves of the PRC alone. Thus, a further increase in resources will be required to support the new lending facilities. To meet this need, perhaps, the current total quota size should also be doubled at the least.
Lending Facilities
The IMF introduced the FCL in 2009, in response to the criticism that its lending facilities to address unexpected foreign liquidity crises faced by EMEs are too rigid and have costly policy conditionality. However, only three countries -Poland, Mexico, and Colombia -used FCL, as they were facing severe liquidity problems in the global financial crisis. Other EMEs, including Korea, refused to use the FCL though they also faced severe liquidity problems, being afraid of the stigma effect.
The crisis highlighted three potential gaps in the global financial safety net. First, many countries and observers feel that the FCL is not as predictable and effective an instrument as it was initially planned to be. Second, there is a sense that the FCL caters to only a narrow group of countries and it offers too little to those well-performing countries that are ineligible for FCL. Third, the IMF does not have adequate instruments to act proactively and contain risks in a systemic crisis where several major EMEs, with varying degrees of concern about the stigma effect, may benefit from an early and clear signal by having access to financial resources to calm the market fears that stoke contagion.
The IMF is not the only institution with a mandate to provide a global financial safety net. Central banks of reserve currency-issuing countries and regional financing arrangements, such as the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), also have a role to play. In the case of Korea, the swap arrangement between the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Korea in 2009 was the most effective way to calm foreign exchange market instability. Furthermore, careful consideration will need to be practiced in balancing the goal of a more effective global financial safety net against potential moral hazard and the need for adequate safeguards. However, the above observations still call for a reform of the IMF's financing facilities.
The IMF has recently introduced some innovations to its lending facilities, including the modification of the existing lending program as well as the introduction of new lending facilities (FCL and PCL, as discussed above). The IMF also has been discussing with G20 governments on how it might, in well-defined circumstances, use a multicountry swap line mechanism to offer liquidity unilaterally to a limited set of systemically important countries with strong policy records. This has not yet materialized.
Moral hazards and resource constraints could be obstacles to the expansion of the global safety net through the reform of the IMF's financing facilities. However, given the strong and increasing demand for foreign reserves for self-insurance by EMEs, which threatens the stability of the IMS, these reforms are badly needed. The new facilities would be useful additions to the IMF lending armory and would enhance its capacity to act as international lender of last resort.
Bilateral swap arrangements between central banks are only on an ad hoc and temporary basis, while they could be a very effective tool to stabilize the foreign exchange market in time of global financial crisis. Multilateralization and institutionalization of the swap arrangements through the IMF could be an effective way of building a global financial safety net, providing a global public good in the current global financial market environment where national economies are closely integrated, and there is little distinction between the national financial system and the global one. To some extent, it may be the responsibility of the central banks that issue international reserve currency (especially the Federal Reserve)
to provide the global financial system with some role of "lender of last resort" themselves. If this is difficult to institutionalize due to these banks' national laws, it may be done indirectly through the IMF. These central banks could commit some resources under certain conditions to the IMF, with the IMF in turn providing a modality to use these resources for EMEs according to certain prespecified rules and conditions.
Surveillance
Increased access to and expansion of the IMF's emergency lending facilities should be accompanied by greater and more effective surveillance of member country economies by the IMF. The IMF failed to establish itself as a credible monitor of the IMS or as a provider of credible surveillance over macroeconomic and financial sector policies of individual economies. Most severe criticism centered on the asymmetry of its surveillance -too harsh on small developing countries with a deficit while almost mute on advanced economies and surplus countries.
The IMF surveillance should be strengthened in both the bilateral and multilateral arenas. The IMF should be able to clearly point out the problems in member countries, including advanced economies, which they can take seriously so as to make the necessary policy adjustments. For that, IMF leverage should be strengthened. This can be done only in a multilateral context such as the G20. The G20 should strengthen its function of mutual assessment of macroeconomic policies with the objective of "strong, sustainable, and balanced growth." Global economic surveillance should, indeed, be one of the G20's important roles. If the G20 mandates some significant role for the IMF in this process, strengthened peer pressure could give the IMF's bilateral surveillance more bite. Its multilateral surveillance, too, needs to be strengthened, both on macroeconomic policies and financial market issues. The surveillance role of the IMF should be reinforced to more effectively address problems of exchange rates and payment disequilibria.
In order to produce objective and neutral reports on the economic policies of individual countries, it would be necessary to insulate IMF staff from political pressures from their own board. The IMF needs to issue its own reports on exchange rate policies of major member countries, assessing a wider range of policies including the monetary, fiscal, exchange rate policies and financial sectors more frequently and independently. It should perhaps be the IMF management rather than the board that has the authority to approve such surveillance reports, to help keep staff from political pressure.
The G20 countries have so far committed to a peer-review process for their economic policies and to a broadly defined policy objective. This does not mean that they have committed to specifically defined policy targets for which they can be held accountable in a multilateral forum. This is reminiscent of early IMF attempts, in the 1970s, to get systemically important countries to commit to a multilateral surveillance framework (Lombardi 2010) . Ultimately, these countries distanced themselves from specific commitments and the IMF multilateral surveillance became simply a forum for exchanging views and information on each other's economic policies. With the G7, the IMF played an advisory role; but with the G20, its advisory role is more clearly spelled out, and, given the greater number of economies, needs to be much more strategic. Nevertheless, its role of surveillance is not clearly mandated yet.
The G20 itself should implement an effective mutual assessment on the macroeconomic and financial policies of member countries in the context of well-defined objectives set for the whole group. The IMF should be asked to provide the framework and technical support of this assessment, which should be based on some rigorous quantitative analysis. 4 It may be asked to strengthen the "score-keeping" capacity by allowing it to issue its own quarterly reports on exchange rate and other relevant policies (Subacchi and Driffill 2010) . The IMF would thereby become more vigorously engaged in the mutual assessment process. This would help to increase its leverage in its bilateral surveillance of its major member countries.
The success of mutual assessment or peer-review surveillance depends critically on two essential ingredients: competent staff to support the process, and the strong analytical foundation for studying macroeconomic interactions. It would, in fact, be difficult to find a better alternative to the IMF for this role. What, then, should the IMF do to fulfill this task? In essence, it should perform sharply defined multilateral surveillance, generate greater value and traction from bilateral surveillance, and integrate the two better. For that, it should do more analysis of outward spillovers, and generate new reports covering such spillovers from countries whose policies or circumstances affect the overall system. In order to increase the effectiveness of bilateral surveillance, especially with advanced economies and surplus countries, the IMF should try to reach broader audiences than it does now by producing more timely and topical reports, and increase engagement with stakeholders. By increasing the peer pressure of the global community through its timely and credible reports, it can improve the effectiveness of its bilateral as well as multilateral surveillance. Setting up an independent outside panel of experts, which can regularly evaluate and monitor the IMF's performance in such surveillance, could also be a helpful measure.
Governance/Management
Enhanced surveillance by the IMF would mean increased IMF interventions in member countries' economic policies. However, unless changed from previous practice -one dominated by the traditional powers -it would be regarded by most EMEs as a worse outcome. Hence the most important element of IMF reform is radical change to its governance structure.
There has been widely shared criticism that in the past the IMF has been used as an instrument for industrial nations to achieve their policy objectives. It bailed out creditors of industrial countries and imposed very costly adjustment programs on debtor countries. Mistrust in the IMF is in part due to the perception that its surveillance has been asymmetric, with greatest attention paid to the weaker developing states or those in deficit, while the major deficit and surplus countries, including the US and the PRC, are given too much leeway. Mistrust is also in part due to its policy conditionality based too much (or sometimes axiomatic) "belief in the market." This is not to say that the IMF has made no attempt to overcome this criticism. In recent years, it has in fact become more flexible in its approach to the individual country situations and has somewhat shifted its position from emphasizing quick adjustment to expanded financing as a possible alternative to rapid adjustments (Adam, Collier, and Vines 2010) . Nevertheless, further efforts are needed in order to establish trust among all its member countries, and this can be done most effectively through rebalancing of the governance/management structure of the institution.
There are two major problems with present governance arrangements: the composition and voting structure of the board, and the appointment of management and those at senior positions. The board is too heavily weighted toward industrial countries, especially in Europe, and it fails to give sufficient weight to EMEs and developing countries, which are of course seriously affected by its decisions. Currently, the quota share of advanced economies is more than 60% (US 17.6%, Europe 31%). EMEs and developing countries' share is about 39%. However, Europe's voice can be potentially much bigger than this figure suggests, due to the current composition of the executive board.
At the G20 Seoul Summit it was agreed that 6% of the quota share would be transferred from European to emerging market economies, though the formula to achieve this has not been fully sorted out. It was also agreed that two seats of the executive board currently occupied by Europe would be transferred to EMEs. However, these two measures would not change the governance structure significantly -the US and Western Europe would still dominate decision making through various rules (including the "85% rule" and the veto power of the US) and through the composition of the executive board. Would EMEs, say Asian EMEs, welcome strengthened IMF surveillance with this unchanged governance structure? Unlikely.
The governance structure should be more radically changed, for without it, the IMF risks becoming marginalized as an agent solely for a group of industrial countries. (As noted, there is a large asymmetry between the governance structures of G20 and the IMF.) Ideally, the formula for IMF quota reallocation should give emerging economic powers more representation than their current economic weight (which is based on nominal GDP) justifies. However, as this would be difficult to implement in reality, other measures would have to be sought. One way would be a reconfiguration of the composition of the board of directors, cutting the number of European seats -a single Eurozone seat could be an option.
Another way would be to have the G20 finance ministers meeting as a steering committee for IMF governance, determining the direction of major policy issues. If the G20 became a decision-making ministerial body within the IMF itself, it would reduce the asymmetry both between global economic governance forums and the governance structure of the IMF. This would also help reassert the centrality of the IMF's role as a key institution in IMS. This proposal has been featured in a recent advisory report to the IMF Managing Director (the "Fourth Pillar" report) and has been put forward by a number people, including Mervyn King, governor of the Bank of England (Lombardi 2010 , King 2010 . 5 The progress of reform of the IMS, including increased allocation and wider use of SDR as international reserve assets, could be facilitated when this kind of significant change in the IMF governance structure occurs.
On the second problem, that of appointments, the selection process for managing director should become more transparent and be open to qualified non-Europeans, including those from EMEs. Appointments to senior positions should be more merit-based, and better balanced between staff from advanced economies and EMEs. (Similar changes will be required for the World Bank.
Concluding remarks
One of the fundamental causes for the recent global financial crisis was the "institutional mismatch" -the mismatch between the institutions and the market in the global financial system. The development of institutions fell far behind that of financial markets over the last two or three decades. Integrated and tightly interconnected financial markets and global economy now require a new regulatory framework, which entails the reform of the IFIs and the IMS. At the same time, more effective economic policy coordination among major players of the global economy is needed, and this cannot be achieved without establishing an effective global economic governance system. This paper has discussed the necessary reforms of the IMF and the IMS, and how to make the G20 an effective governance forum. History shows us that the world has suffered when incumbent powers fail to give rising powers their proper place. Inclusion of major EMEs, including the PRC, Brazil, India, and others in the G20, has been the right move. The challenge is now how to make the G20 effective. Without institutional innovations within the G20, there is a high risk that its summits will follow the path of previous summit meetings, such as G7/G8. 
